Given that Delliquanti has collaborated with coauthor David Axe before, it would be interesting to learn why the authors picked her for this task� Coauthors Kevin Knodell and David Axe are both freelance journalists / war correspondents� Axe has produced graphic novels before, most notably his extremely self-focused, slightly fictionalized War Is Boring (2010) . Knodell currently produces the Acts of Valor comic series for Naval History magazine� Axe provides the preface to The 'Stan. To his credit, he is quite candid about his feelings about the war and his condemnation of the actions of the United States� His position is strong enough to raise legitimate questions regarding The 'Stan's potential political agenda, the possibility of cherry-picked memoirs, pointed sequencing of stories, and so on� Neither Knodell nor Delliquanti gets a similar opportunity to address the reader� This is a missed opportunity both for The 'Stan and for Dead Reckoning� Without a preface, the memoirs would have at least appeared to stand or fall on their own merit� Had Knodell and Delliquanti provided their points of view, either separately or in conjunction with Axe, questions regarding agendas and biases might be fewer� It is also understandable that many readers would want to know more about how the authors selected the stories and collaborated on the book� Why were other stories discarded, if they were? Delliquanti's voice potentially would be more welcome than Axe's, as she, more than anyone, brings the memoirs to life�
The 'Stan represents a notable effort� Although readers' opinions about its overall quality will vary, it deserves an audience� More importantly, Despite the title, ground forces feature in every case study� Indeed, that basic observation is central to Schinella's argument� In each case study, although the intervening power focused on using airpower, that airpower supported ground forces present at the scene� This observation holds true even in cases in which the stated intent of the intervening powers was not to provide support for any particular faction in the conflict� Schinella asserts that the goals, behavior, and effectiveness of these proxies must be understood to assess fully the impact of airpower� For example, employment of NATO airpower in Libya blunted the Qaddafi regime's battlefield advantages, while Libyan geography allowed NATO airpower to create a de facto sanctuary where nascent opposition forces could coalesce� These opposition ground forces eventually toppled the regime� The result, he asserts, should be called "a victory made possible by airpower" rather than "a victory by airpower" (p� 286)� In cases in which the application of airpower achieved battlefield success, Schinella observes that it has been largely ineffective in giving intervening powers a voice in what follows the conflict� Even a successful case of "bombs without boots, " he suggests, may require "boots after bombs" to shape the peace and secure the desired strategic end state� Across his five case studies, Schinella observes a strong pattern of air forces exhausting the fixed targets associated with an adversary, as well as available stocks of precision munitions, early in the conflict� He also notes the importance of strategic patience for the intervening powers� Time can allow airpower to enable and shape proxies, who then can have impact on the ground in ways that airpower cannot� While this book is about airpower, the specific tools of airpower or the tactical nuances of its employment consume little of the volume� This strategic view serves the reader well, with the exception that drones-perhaps the most novel and distinctive application of airpower in the last two decades-do not factor into these case studies, and thus hardly are mentioned� In a debate marked by over a century of passion, this volume is notable for its objectivity� Schinella's professional role as the National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence makes him the most senior official in the U�S� Intelligence Community who focuses purely on understanding foreign military institutions, capabilities, and operations� He has an insider's deep understanding of U�S� and foreign styles of warfare, while at the same time he has no allegiance to any particular military branch or tribe� In the end, Schinella concludes that "airpower interventions can succeed without committing ground troops-but only under the right circumstances" (p� 287)� Even in these cases, however, "it is never as easy as you think� " His clear and thoughtful consideration of how and when "bombs without boots" can serve the national interest is why this book deserves a place in the collection of every professional and strategist tasked with employing airpower to its full potential� DALE C� RIELAGE 2 Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 17 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/17
